Telic monism in logic is the thesis that there is one single philosophically primary goal to logic. A different way to put it is that there is only one canonical application to logic. This thesis is widely present—implicitly or more explicitly—in the literature on the philosophy of logic, yet has not been examined nor argued for extensively. In this paper I will present and critically examine telic monism. One prominent candidate for the canonical application of logic, namely the formal codification (...) of logical consequence in natural language, will be challenged directly. The critique will then be generalized by appealing to a practice-based philosophy of logic. The general argument I put forth here claims that we have no principled reason to assume there to be just one primary goal to logic. Rather, I claim that it is more plausible that there actually is a variety of goals, purposes and applications to logic, without one of them enjoying primacy over the others. If this argument succeeds, at least one of the consequences is that it allows for a kind of logical pluralism that has previously been deemed insignificant, namely logical instrumentalism. (shrink)

The work of mathematician and logician Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) marks the transition from substantial to deflationary views about truth.

One way to theorize about we-identities—the identities that individual subjects have as ‘one of us’—is in terms of the uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality of group members. The social-psychological theory of self-categorization epitomizes this approach, which has strongly influenced contemporary phenomenological research on the we. This paper argues that this approach has one important and largely overlooked limitation: the we-identities tied to close personal relationships—exemplified by long-term friendships and romantic partnerships—are based on patterns of interpersonal interaction and integration through which individuals (...) tend to grasp their non-substitutability and complementarity. This limitation suggests that another approach is needed to tackle the we-identities characteristic of close personal relationships. I outline such an approach, by combining resources from classical phenomenology and ongoing research on the socially extended mind. (shrink)

Inspired by Kit Fine’s theory of arbitrary objects, we explore some ways in which the generic structure of the natural numbers can be presented. Following a suggestion of Saul Kripke’s, we discuss how basic facts and questions about this generic structure can be expressed in the framework of Carnapian quantified modal logic.

What I would like to say about politics does not fit the mold of common discourse and most political essays. Frankly, I have a rather negative and skeptical view of the concept that a group of people somehow has the knowledge to know what is best and the right to impose their will on the rest of the population. In fact, I think it is mankind's greatest folly to think that we can pick out a group of people from the (...) population at large -- known to be selfish, brutish and not necessarily very honest -- and to believe that these selected individuals will some how rise above the level from which they came, and to believe in these selected individuals so strongly that we will even give them guns and a monopoly over force! (shrink)

This book presents a study of the nature and conditions of historical knowledge, conducted through a study of the relevant theories of Hume, Hegel and Vico. It is usually thought that in order to establish historical facts, we have to have a theory of human nature to support our arguments. Hume, Hegel and Vico all subscribed to this view, and are therefore discussed in detail. Professor Pompa goes on to argue that there is in fact no way of discovering anything (...) about human nature except through historical investigation. It is necessary therefore to find a different way of thinking about how we discover historical facts. This is done in the last chapter where, in opposition to almost all present views, it is argued that we must have a framework of inherited knowledge before we can believe in anything which results from historical enquiry. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the relationship between the meanings of the particular aesthetic judgments (I) pronounced by any person on artwork and the artwork itself. The purpose is to state the following hypothesis: it is false that a consumer is stupid and unable to recognize the quality work of art and meaning of, it is more, all the phrases enunciated in natural language is not a conjecture, but that recognize and reflect the quality of the work. A work of art like (...) any other human product, is likely to be measured and therefore valued, fact, despite the opinion of the artists. Preliminary results obtained lead us to that decision there are common patterns for each of the elements of the art world, which also requires the formulation of a much more simple and elegant. (shrink)

Clásicos y modernos -- Convenciones y mixturas -- Cine independiente -- El nuevo canon -- Cine latinoamericano -- Cine ecuatoriano -- Temas.